Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport
1 November 2005
Senator MILNE-The question I want to ask relates in part to bird flu and also in part to the disease in Tasmanian devils. As a preface to the question, my concern is that since the early nineties investment in public interest veterinary work has receded, particularly in the states. To speak of my own case, in Tasmania it has been cut back significantly so that there is very little proactive surveillance of native animal and bird populations to identify emerging diseases. So, at the point at which the disease is recognised and discovered, it is already entrenched in the native population and could have transferred to domestic populations and/or humans. My experience around the world is that there is an increasing problem of transfer of disease from native animal populations to humans, back and forth, or to production.
In relation to the bird flu, whilst I accept what you are saying about a national response team being in place, what confidence could we have that there is sufficient proactive surveillance in the states to be able to identify that the disease has arrived, before it has reached a point where it is already entrenched? Then the national response team is called in; but we have already got a crisis rather than early surveillance. For example, we will have the short-tailed shearwaters coming back. What proactive surveillance is being organised for migratory flocks coming back to Australia this summer and so forth? On the Tasmanian devil it is the same thing. It took a number of years before it was actually identified in native animal populations, by which time it was entrenched.
So my question is: do you consider that we have actually reached the point, in a global context and in the national context, where we need greater investment in proactive surveillance of native animal populations because of this issue of emerging diseases? And, specifically in relation to the bird flu, are you satisfied that the states have got adequate surveillance in place such that we would have early warning to bring in a national response team?
Ms Hewitt-I might ask Gardner Murray to make some comments in response on our behalf. But I did particularly want to say as part of the response that we have been doing a lot of work with the states. In fact, last week at the ministerial council meetings for both primary industries and natural resource management, Commonwealth and state ministers collectively signed off on what we are calling a National Biosecurity Strategy, which is aimed at bringing more collaborative work between jurisdictions.
Taking a lesson from what we have done on the production animal side, we are progressively doing better on the plant side in terms of emergency management, surveillance and so on and recognising we have some gaps, particularly in native flora and fauna. We have now had agreed by the ministers a six-month work program to develop a plan of action around all those issues. It is difficult for us to say whether more funding is going to be or needs to be available. But, at the very least, to begin with we have agreed to work together to prioritise and to set out plans for handling the priority issues. I think that is an important new piece of work we have under way. I will ask Gardner to speak particularly about the avian influenza and related surveillance questions.
Dr Murray-I agree and I think most of my colleagues would agree that the re-emerging threats that have occurred over the last 15 years are significant. If my memory serves me correctly, something like 75 per cent of new infectious diseases of humans over the last 15 years are zoonotic-that is, they are transmissible from animals to man. The figures are there and the facts are there. Having said that, I would have to say that, with the kind of system we have in Australia, it has delivered in that, for example, we have picked up the lissavirus, the Menangle virus, Hendra virus, Trichinella pseudospiralis in Tasmania-and I could name a number more. But it seems to me, my colleagues and the secretary that this now needs to be brought together in a more coherent fashion. Hence the reasons, in one part anyway, for the National Biosecurity Strategy and also a reason for setting up a national surveillance strategy, which will deal not only with production animals, extensive and intensive, but also wildlife. So there is, one might say, a real move to rationalise activities and to take into account the risks that are obviously there. As you know, we have established a wildlife network using the states and funded by the department. Again, that is a modest beginning, but it does have, in my view, a big future.
The issue with avian influenza from our point of view is: what has happened in the past and what do we need to do for the future? We certainly know the kinds of migratory patterns of birds. There have been many thousands of samples taken over the years in Kununurra in the Northern Territory, in Victoria and in Cape York looking at the potential for avian influenza. There is no question that there are avian influenza A types of a very low prevalence in shorebirds. That tells us what I think everyone else knows in the world: that native birds act as a host. The next step is to refine that program and do a bit more and look at their migratory patterns. I think you mentioned Tasmania.
Senator MILNE-Yes.
Dr Murray-We also need to look at the linkages between migrating birds and wild birds within Australia-the ones that are really risky with avian influenza like ducks, geese and swans. That is being designed at the moment. In fact, I may well be able to send out a letter on this during the week.
We do have that little bit of surveillance on the avian influenza front but, to be frank, it is obviously not perfect, given the millions of birds that come in to our shores. Therefore, it has to be supplemented by a series of other surveillance activities. Somebody mentioned to me this morning-I think it was Mr Biddle-that there is a network of several hundred birdwatchers who are ready to report on dead birds and so on. That is another form of surveillance. In recent times deaths in mutton birds have been followed up. We also followed up the fact that in Cape York, as I recall, a number of crows died. There are systems in place but they can obviously be refined.
I turn to the Tasmanian devil issue, which you used as an example of a disease that has been around for maybe 10 years, and how prior warning could have helped under those circumstances. That is an example of a situation where prior warning can perhaps help. Although the department of environment supports or funds the Tasmanian government in looking at the facial tumour issue there, the secretary has always indicated that we have epidemiological expertise and that, if the Tasmanian government and the department of environment wish to avail themselves of that expertise, we can certainly have a look.
Senator MILNE-Have the Tasmanian government asked for that epidemiological help?
Dr Murray-They certainly have not asked me. I cannot say if they have asked the environmental department or other people.
Senator MILNE-Has the money made available to Tasmania for assistance with the facial tumours been tagged in any way to epidemiological work?
Dr Murray-This is managed by Environment; I cannot answer that. I recall that there was a government announcement of $2 million, and $1 million has been allocated this year.
Senator O'BRIEN-In the report about Minotaur that I was talking about, there was some criticism of the leadership role played by the Commonwealth during that exercise. In May Mr McCutcheon told the committee that, at the time, the national management group concept was in its really early days and that he hoped that during the next major exercise it would deliver better national leadership. Has there been any further development of the national management group concept? What has been done or what has changed that would give us greater confidence in the ability of this group to deliver better national leadership?
Mr McCutcheon-There have been no deliberate changes or readjustments to the national management group concept. The major advantage the group has had is that it has had to meet on a number of occasions to deal with specific emergencies. In light of that experience a number of the operational aspects of the group have been strengthened. In the context of the forthcoming exercise, Exercise Eleusis, those strengthened arrangements will again be tested. In addition to that, we are branching out into involving other Commonwealth agencies-in this case, Health-to ensure that we have a sort of cross-government, cross-jurisdictional approach to managing the disease at the highest level.
Senator O'BRIEN-You also told the committee in May that Animal Health Australia was undertaking consultation regarding some 19 actions and amendments to the cost-sharing deed and was developing an explanatory memorandum to the deed. Has that process been completed?
Mr McCutcheon-It has not been completed, to my knowledge. My understanding is that they have had meetings with a number of industry organisations and have also had meetings with a number of state jurisdictions, but there is still some work to be done on that.
Senator O'BRIEN-When is that expected to be completed?
Mr McCutcheon-That is a question I would have to put to Animal Health Australia. Certainly, they are operating on the basis that it needs to be finished sooner rather than later.
Senator O'BRIEN-Dr Biddle told us in May that as an adjunct exercise to Minotaur there was an attempt to get an agreement on zoning from a number of other countries, including the US, New Zealand and Canada, and that the lesson learnt was that even in a real emergency it could take many months to get such an agreement. Has there been any progress on this front? Does the department still believe that it will take a very long time to progress a zoning application with our trading partners?